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out "serious and incalculable consequences." The Empress was offended, but replied that the king of France was too late in his offer of intervention; "for the Crimea and Kuban were already in possession of the Empress." And so to Sir James Harris, when he expressed the hope of England that her warlike advances might come to an end, the ministers declared the impossibility of the Empress's retrograding. "Having taken the title of sovereign of the Crimea, she cannot abandon it."*

It was thus that, unconsciously to America, the appearance of the United States upon the stage of nations was the occasion of the annexation of the Crimea to the Russian empire. And so John Smith's debts were paid. The "serious and incalculable consequences" prophesied by the Bourbon minister are as serious and incalculable as ever.

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- ART. IX. — 1. HANSARD'S *Parliamentary Debates*. Third Series. Vols. 131, 132.
2. *Confidential Correspondence between the Russian and English Governments*. Presented to Parliament, March, 1854.
3. *Diplomatic Circulars of the European Cabinets in 1854 and 1855*.
4. *Papers relating to the Negotiations at Vienna on the Eastern Question*. Presented to Parliament, May, 1855.
5. *Speech of EARL GREY in the House of Lords*, May 25, 1855.

THE Queen of England thought it proper, on the 27th of March, 1854, to inform Parliament that the negotiations in which her Majesty, in concert with her allies, had for some time been engaged with the Emperor of all the Russias had terminated, and that she felt bound "to afford active assist-

* That Catharine was enabled to seize the Crimea because the Western powers were preoccupied, has always been evident. Lord Malmesbury's letters (Sir James Harris's), are of peculiar interest now, in showing that all parties at the moment were aware that this was her only easy opportunity.

ance to her ally, the Sultan, against unprovoked aggression"; —relying with confidence on the zeal and devotion of Parliament, and on the exertions of her brave and loyal subjects, to support her in her determination to employ the power and resources of the nation "for protecting the dominions of the Sultan against the encroachments of Russia." The Lords and Commons assured Her Majesty of their firm determination to co-operate with her in a "vigorous resistance to the projects of a sovereign whose further aggrandizement would be dangerous to the independence of Europe." Such was the programme, as developed in the Queen's message and the loyal address in answer to it, of a war which terminated a European peace of forty years, and which committed Great Britain to a long and dubious contest with the great Northern power which she had done so much to rescue from barbarism, and with which, trivial interruptions excepted, she had lived in amity since the days of Ivan and Elizabeth, a period of nearly three hundred years. At the same time the Emperor of the French announced the crisis of his Eastern diplomacy, and in the flush and prestige of unbroken fortunes at home tempted his star in a new and a broader field.

The combined resources of the three powers now at war with Russia made the odds against her seem overwhelming. England, assuming the sovereignty over one hundred and fifty millions of the human race, claiming the dominion of the seas, and boasting that her morning drums follow the sun round the earth; France, eager to add the triumphs of another generation to her fourteen centuries of military glory; their united fleets sweeping from the seas at the first breath of war every vestige of an enemy from Archangel to the Circassian coast; Turkey, two thirds of her subjects fierce with fanatic courage, calling from the depths of Asia the untamed hordes that had known no change since the Prophet, to rally to his standard in the final battle of Islam; — against these it appeared but the desperation of madness when, more haughtily even than he had borne himself with a single foe, the Romanoff took up the gauntlet.

We propose to inquire how far the alleged causes of this war are adequate and just, to show how its objects have

successively developed themselves with the progress of events, and how far they are by common consent secured, and to divine from the story of its varied fortunes whether its success has given or is likely to give the right of increased demands, or to impose the duty of greater concessions. In many of its aspects the subject is already exhausted, and the experience of the last two years must have brought such convictions to intelligent minds, as, by exempting from discussion certain propositions which at the outset might have required a process of demonstration, will permit us sensibly to circumscribe our present purpose. But we shall intentionally leave out of sight no incident or argument which can serve, however remotely, to aid us in the impartial judgment we hope to obtain and to establish.

When, in consequence of the refusal of the Ottoman Porte to sign a convention demanded by Prince Menchikoff, which should confirm a right of protection claimed under the treaty of Kainardji, and recognized in every general treaty between Russia and Turkey during three quarters of a century, and in order also to preserve an equilibrium, disturbed, as it was alleged, by the presence of a foreign fleet in Turkish waters, a Russian army crossed the Pruth, the four great neutral powers entered at once upon the task of mediation, and as the result of their labors presented to the Emperor of Russia the first Vienna note. To their surprise, it was unhesitatingly accepted. But the note, if not a blunder, was at least defective. In stipulating that Turkey should remain faithful "to the spirit and the letter of treaties" granting to the Greek Church "equal privileges with other Christian communities," it placed twelve millions of the Sultan's subjects in the same category with a few small bodies of Christians who had been by special firmans exempted from *political* allegiance to the Porte. When therefore the note was presented to the consideration of the Divan, the error was detected, and the text modified, with respect to equality of rights with other Christians, by the reservation, "being subjects of the Porte." The Emperor in turn refused to recognize the Turkish modifications; Count Nesselrode arguing, with a sort of imperial logic, that, if the modifications were important, the terms

were not those which his master had accepted; if not, that it was not becoming the dignity of Russia to submit to them. This arrogant spirit was not however shown towards the mediating powers, and soon after, at the German Conference at Olmutz, the Emperor expressed his willingness to accept the note fully and freely; not in the sense of the Russian circular, which had actually claimed the interpretation the Divan had pointed out as possible, but as those who framed it might see fit to interpret it in a special clause to be added to the original note. It has been found convenient occasionally to omit all mention of this first concession of the Emperor Nicholas. Properly or not, he had declined what he termed the dictation of the Porte, yet was willing to confide to the European powers the dignity and honor of his empire. But it happened that there was an irresistible pressure behind even a despot's throne. The contest had already excited the fiercest passions of Mohammedanism. The "Old Turk" party and the Asiatic tribes scorned every alternative but war; the "Ulemas" and "Softas" quoted texts from the Koran to prove that the time had come for the sword of Islam once more to strike the heretic; the uncouth and frenzied "Bashi Bazouks" threatened the Seraglio itself; and before the news reached Constantinople that the Emperor had abated his pretensions, war was already declared, and Omer Pacha occupied the line of the Danube with the advanced corps of an army of one hundred and thirty thousand men.

The events of the war, among which was the affair at Sinope, had not upon the whole been well for Turkey, when, in December of the same year, the ambassadors of the four powers were authorized to declare to the Porte, that the Emperor, not regarding the thread of negotiation as broken by the declaration of war or by the transactions which had followed it, desired only to see secured the perfect equality of rights and privileges granted by the Sultan and his ancestors to the Christian communities; and to inform the Turkish court that negotiations would be based upon, (1.) an evacuation of the Principalities by the Russian army, — (2.) a renewal of the treaties, — (3.) a firman confirming the *spiritual* advantages only of the non-Mussulman subjects of the Porte; and

Redschid Pacha undertook to have this note accepted by the Divan. Its reply was as haughty as if the armies of the Sultan were threatening St. Petersburg. The national council demanded that Moldavia and Wallachia should be evacuated as a *sine qua non*, and that the territorial condition of Turkey should not be changed; and the Porte declared that the treaties existing before the war, between itself and Russia, would not be renewed. From that time it was clear that the grand object of Turkey in declaring war was not primarily to drive the Russians back across the Pruth, nor yet to secure her own interpretation of a treaty; but, by the declaration itself, to rend away the fetters imposed on her at the close of previous wars, trusting to the chances of a contest begun under happier auspices, to recover an independence forfeited eighty years ago. It was a bold step, but in the determination to throw off finally and completely so much as a pretext for interference, the Turkish nation deserved and received a sympathy almost universal; and so far as the special claims of Russia are concerned, the war has for Turkey, by the consent of all Europe, already accomplished its object, and Russia has yielded every shadow of claim upon her that she ever possessed.

As it became daily more evident that the two Western powers were to be drawn into the conflict, their secret hostility to Russia threw off its disguises, and on the 17th of February, 1854, the British Ministry startled Parliament by the assertion, that in the Eastern Question "the Russian government by her agents and by herself had exhausted every modification of untruth, ending with a series of positive falsehoods." A charge so bold and distinct against an individual whose high personal character had previously been the admiration of Europe, could not end there. Rumors were already flitting about in the Continental capitals, and circulated freely at St. Petersburg, that there had been negotiations not long before between the Emperor Nicholas and the British Ministry, and that the attitude then assumed by England was not that which she now presented, with regard to propositions respecting contingencies in Turkey. With such particularity was the substance of these negotiations known, that an ex-

pression of the Emperor was quoted, which was found to have been actually used in a conversation with the British envoy. It was not forgotten, moreover, that in the winter of the preceding year the "Times" newspaper had argued the cause of Russia and assailed that of Turkey with such vigor and persistency, that Lord Palmerston afterwards charged it with having derived its "inspiration" from St. Petersburg itself. The papers relating to the Eastern Question had already been laid before Parliament at its request; and it was with no small surprise that Englishmen saw, in the response of the *Journal de St. Petersbourg* to what it termed the "brutal outrage" of Lord John Russell, the statement that that person held in his own hands the most full and frank declarations of the Emperor, confidentially made, which the English government itself had acknowledged to be moderate and just. Before the attention of Parliament could be directed to this counter-declaration, the "Times" took upon itself to retort, that in those negotiations the "Emperor of Russia had distinctly proposed to England" the dismemberment of the Turkish empire, and that the proposition had been "indignantly rejected"; and Ministers repeated this charge. The knowledge of the "Times" was so accurate in relation to this matter, that, during the debate upon it afterwards in the House of Commons, Mr. Layard accused the government of having authorized the Russian articles in that journal the year before, in order to ascertain how such propositions as were really made would be received by the public. It turned out, however, that the "Times" only attempted the manœuvre upon its own account, its information having been derived from a discharged clerk in the Foreign Office.

When therefore it was answered, that the person who had made a charge of falsehood against the Emperor had in his hands the evidence of its falsity, it remained for Lord John Russell, unable to deny the existence of the papers, either to retract his words, or to attempt to substantiate them from the papers themselves. The former alternative might have suggested itself to an honorable but impetuous man; the British Minister chose the latter. The British Cabinet was compelled, therefore, to publish at least a part of the correspondence which

had been carried on between itself and the Russian government, and the whole world is free to determine if it was true that the Emperor had proposed to "dismember Turkey," and, what is a much more serious matter, if it was true that the propositions, such as they were, were "indignantly rejected."

In the year 1844, the court and the people of England hailed the imperial visit of their powerful ally with every mark of elation and enthusiasm, the *entente* became almost fraternal, and the bonds between the two countries were believed to be indissoluble. The Duke of Wellington, Sir Robert Peel, and the Earl of Aberdeen directed the policy of the British government, all of them warm supporters of the Russian alliance; as the last-named statesman, now the only survivor, has declared quite recently, "every man ought to be, who valued the interests of England." After the Emperor's departure, Baron Brunnow, the Russian Ambassador, presented to the English government a paper, indorsed, "Memorandum founded on Communications received from the Emperor of Russia during his Majesty's Imperial Visit to England in June, 1844." This document was not kept with the archives, but transmitted with an explanatory note to successive Foreign Secretaries, whom Baron Brunnow never failed to remind of its existence. The paper was understood by all who received it officially to be a secret and definitive arrangement as to the future of Turkey, from which France was to be excluded. It stated that Russia and Austria were united by the principle of "perfect identity," and that, "if England as the principal maritime power acts in concord with them, it is to be supposed that France would find herself obliged to act in conformity with the course agreed upon between St. Petersburg, Vienna, and London." It is to be remarked, that a few years later the courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna transacted a little business on their own account in Eastern Europe, which would have made a complicity in any territorial re-arrangement originating with them distasteful to the people of Great Britain, and an impossible position to a minister of the crown. This was prior also, on the other hand, to the cordial hatred which sprang up between Austria

and England consequent upon Lord Palmerston's pulverization by Prince Schwartzburgh. If, therefore, any proposals for partitioning Turkey were ever made, they were made then, and England, acquiescing in them for ten years, succeeded in that kind of business to Prussia, who seems to have retired from the partnership. This scheme, coming as it did to the knowledge of the French government, is a full and complete justification of its Eastern diplomacy, on which, true to the traditional and necessary policy of France, its Emperor had entered to prevent a nearer approach of Russia to the Mediterranean. We may surely pardon in her, too, something on the score of wounded national pride.

At the close of 1852 a change in the English government found Lord Aberdeen Premier, and Lord John Russell Foreign Secretary, and the entire new ministry was supposed to be not especially friendly to the person who had just accomplished a vigorous *coup d'état*, and was, with rapid strides, bringing France to accept the fact, with possibly the traditions, of the Empire. The English press, representing the popular feeling, in commenting upon the head of the French government and his acts, had plunged deeper into the sewerage of ribaldry and libel than it had felt called upon to do since it had upheld the British theory of the domestic affairs of Napoleon the First. Under these propitious circumstances, the Emperor Nicholas congratulated the British envoy, Sir Hamilton Seymour, upon the change, and requested him to convey to Lord Aberdeen, "for whom, during an acquaintance of forty years, he had entertained equal esteem and regard," the assurance that he hoped the ministry would be of long duration. The Emperor proceeded to say, that it was never more essential than then, that he and the English government should be on the best of terms, and these words he desired to be conveyed to Lord John Russell. In this and at subsequent interviews, he affirmed that Turkey was in a very critical state, and "might give a great deal of trouble"; that she was disorganized and falling to pieces, and that the British government were deceived if they supposed otherwise; that the fall would be a misfortune, and that it was "important England and Russia should have a good understanding, and neither take any

decisive step of which the other is not apprised." Sir Hamilton replied, that he was "rejoiced to hear this language, that this was his own view of the matter." The Emperor, moreover, stated candidly what arrangements respecting Turkey and Constantinople he would not permit, and requested an interchange of views, with which he does not appear to have been favored. It has been loudly proclaimed, that a bribe was offered for England's consent to the partition of Turkey; and there is a passage in the correspondence, which, taken by itself, that is to say, garbled for the purpose, looks extremely like such a proposition. The Emperor did say, that "if, in the event of a distribution of the Ottoman succession upon the fall of the empire," England should take possession of Egypt and Candia, he should have no objection to offer. With regard to his own share, he appears only to have suggested that the provinces of European Turkey should be independent states under his protection. But the whole basis and theory of the memorandum and the correspondence being only an arrangement by which the fall of the Ottoman empire should not take at least Russia and England by surprise, the mention of Egypt and Candia belongs to the details of a general plan, certainly never objected to during a ten years' knowledge of the secret by England. Until the Emperor of the French moved so skilfully in the matter, there was not an intelligent person in England who did not think that, in the natural order and progress of events, the Mohammedan rule in Europe must shortly cease to exist; and there was no one who dared to say, that, having once fallen, that dominion ought to be restored. Not negatively alone, but positively, England and Russia were committed to this determination. It has happened since 1844, that England has created a vast commercial interest in the permanence of the Ottoman empire. On that principle, the weaker and worse the Turks' rule is, the better for England. Of course Russia can have no such interest. The Emperor Alexander has freely declared, at the recent conferences, that it is no part of his intention to uphold that empire at the expense of Russian blood, and we are disposed to pardon him if he has no better reason to assign for this avowal than that he does not think the advantages

to be gained worth the sacrifice. Concerning Russian designs upon Constantinople, the Emperor was sufficiently explicit. Disowning the fantastic ambition of Catharine, he declared that in any event his occupation would be but provisional; and the English government is not entitled to go behind that declaration. Its complicity in the antecedents of the case is too decided to permit the assumption, that it is for England to determine when the Emperor is to be trusted, and when not. While we have not for a moment doubted the traditional policy of Russia with regard to Constantinople, it is not to be denied that individual heads of the Russian Empire may waive or postpone that policy. And whatever Nicholas might have hoped from the friendship and acquiescence of England, even so late as 1853, his successor must see, by her desertion, at least the temporary frustration of the scheme.

The immediate cause of the embroilment was the right of protection insisted upon by the Emperor. We have already seen that the right, in a religious sense, was conceded by all the powers, and this correspondence shows that no government had gone farther than the English in admitting it to be incontestable. In 1829, Lord Aberdeen in fact asserted that Russia was entitled to put her own construction on her treaties. Lord John, after commending, in his despatch to the British ambassador, the "wise" and "disinterested" course which the Emperor had so long followed, admits this right to be "no doubt prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty"; and in the debate on the war-message, which he opened, he pertinently argues, that in some "exceptional" cases the Emperor was bound to give even political protection, and that therefore it was determined to take that privilege from him by establishing a new provision. Now it has not been denied that some exceptional cases had occurred requiring intervention, and Menchikoff's mission was to prevent their recurrence by treaty. The interpretation of the Vienna note must not be confounded with this first demand of Russia, which is the point of departure of the whole affair. Russia can hardly be blamed for taking more than she had asked, when it was offered to her by the first Vienna conference, and it is plainly shown from this correspondence, that England

had for ten years justified the position of the Emperor towards Turkey, and emphatically supported it during that very ministry. The matter had been anticipated in the memorandum of 1844, in which it was agreed that Turkey, having a bad habit of "endeavoring to free itself from treaty obligations, and the attempt of the other party to enforce their fulfilment being apt to create jealousy among the other powers," the arrangement then put in writing provided that no other power should in such case interfere. The English ministry well knew what was the purpose of the recent mission. Said the Emperor to Sir Hamilton, "I tell you plainly, Menchikoff is at Constantinople; I will not be trifled with; if the Porte will not consent to his demands, I will use force." The first class of demands concerned the Holy Places, and was settled by France yielding the privileges she had just obtained for the Catholics. England pretends that there was something more than the right of protection afterwards demanded, taking advantage of vulgar rumors which Count Nesselrode pronounced false. To inflame popular prejudice, Lord John stooped to assert that it was understood in the East that an army of four hundred thousand men had been offered to the Sultan without the knowledge of England, a force which therefore *might* be intended to act against her. This charge also is in strict harmony with the systematic misuse of arguments and terms which characterizes the department of the war which the British government and public at once took entirely to themselves,—the attack upon the personal character of the Emperor. The correspondence discloses the fact, that Nicholas did inform Sir Hamilton Seymour, months before, that he had offered the Sultan a large force, and Lord John and every one else knew that the offer was to enable Turkey to resist the importunity or menaces of France.

We have dwelt at length upon this secret correspondence, not so much to dispose of the charge of "falsehood," "duplicity," even "perjury," against a sovereign, to whom even death was no protection from ignoble assaults, but because it develops more fully than any other document the primary causes and objects of the war. Had we desired merely to ascertain whether these charges were true, we need only to

have stated, that they are traceable to two distinct and original sources, — Lord John Russell and the London Times; that the House of Lords almost unanimously scouted them with indignation; and that in the Commons and before the people, the men most esteemed by Americans proclaim now boldly, that it was England who deceived Russia, not Russia who played false with England.

It was during this amicable state of things at St. Petersburg, that, on the 28th of January, 1853, the French government also solicited a cordial understanding with England, not only to aid in settling the question of the Holy Places, but to "effect a steady opposition to the menace of war," indicated by the concentration of Russian troops near the Turkish frontier. We know nothing of the progress of this counter-negotiation beyond the fact that its final result was the alliance of March, 1854. But we do know that when the French fleet was summoned to the East, Lord Clarendon, the British Foreign Secretary, informed the Emperor of Russia, that "he regretted that the French fleet had sailed," but that the position of the French Government differed in many respects from that of the British. But we have no space to continue the long chain of evidence which establishes beyond controversy the fact, that it was not till months after the affair at Sinope that the Emperor of Russia had the faintest reason to suppose that the British government was not acting in perfect unison with him, or that it was possible for it to unite its policy with that of France. We trust, however, that we have established the basis for a correct appreciation of the relative position of the four countries at the end of March, 1854.

Nearly three weeks before the declaration of war, the largest and best fleet that had ever left the shores of England set sail for the Baltic, with every surrounding of confidence and enthusiasm. Led on their way by the sovereign herself, the hundreds of thousands who looked upon the gallant sight saw no clouds above, no obstacle to a deadlier blow than had ever been dealt to the marine or blackened the shores of an enemy.* Almost a shadow of regret was felt that this mighty

* The British fleet alone numbered 44 ships, 2,200 guns, 22,000 men, with steam of 15,000 horse-power.

armament, such as Nelson had never dreamed of, commanded by the most popular admiral in the service, was to be joined by another nearly as powerful from France, to divide the glory. Another combined Armada was already in the East, where, besides, to join the legions of France already pouring in, England had ordered thirty thousand chosen troops,—the flower of her army. As the heavy tread of column after column of stately guardsmen, erect and flushed with hope and pride, echoed through the streets, led by the scions of the great houses whose first triumphs were on the plains of Syria, the blood of the Englishman who bade them farewell might indeed thrill with the pomp and circumstance of war,—of war which *must* be glorious and successful. And to those richer in the almost romantic lore of feudal history, there came across the centuries the glories of the third Crusade, to tell how once before the ships of France and England had anchored in the Bay of Acre, and the same banners had waved over the young king Philip Augustus and the lion-hearted Plantagenet.

In the first treaty by which the Western Powers bound themselves to the support of Turkey, an article was inserted which secured to all the subjects of the Porte, without distinction of creed, complete equality before the law. Another separate and special treaty prescribed reforms so radical in their nature, that the head of the Mohammedan Church, the Sheik-ul-Islam, resigned, perhaps compulsorily, rather than “sanction measures tending to undermine the whole fabric of Islamism”; and at a stormy sitting of the Divan the “Old Turks” declared that it would have been better to yield at once to the Muscovites, who did not demand so much. But the influence of Redschid Pacha, and the pressing necessities of the case, compelled them to agree to the treaty. In the mean time an ultimatum was sent to St. Petersburg, demanding the evacuation of the Principalities before a certain date. A refusal, or the absence of any reply, would be equivalent to a declaration of war. The Emperor had left the capital; but Count Nesselrode informed the messenger, Hon. Captain Blackwood, “that no answer would be given

by the Imperial Court."* From evidence now transpiring from day to day, in the admissions of individuals connected with the governments of the allied powers, it is capable of proof that Russia could not have escaped this war, even had she acceded to the ultimatum. By another convention of the 18th of April, England and France disclaimed all exclusive advantages to themselves, and invited other nations to the alliance.

On the 9th of April, 1854, was signed at Vienna the celebrated protocol in which Prussia and Austria declared that the new attitude which France and England had taken was founded in right, and that the territorial integrity of Turkey and the evacuation of the Principalities ought to be the *sine qua non* of every proposition for peace. They engaged not to enter into any arrangements in opposition to these principles without having deliberated on them in common with France and England; but they assumed no kind of engagement, however indirect, to take part in the conflict. It was plain, even at that early period, that Prussia was restraining Austria, who was not herself inclined to active co-operation with the Allies, except in case of absolute necessity. The position of this power, with a frontier exposed to either belligerent, was more delicate in neutrality, more dangerous in war, than that of the rest of Germany; and we are prepared to see her coming upon the scene cautiously, but with firm and decisive steps. The protocol of the 9th of April, examined carefully, commits the two German powers to no antagonism with Russia, even in principle. It establishes, in fact, nothing to which Russia had not already shown her willingness to accede conditionally. It was not inconsistent with her own professions, and we can detect nothing to which a Russian plenipotentiary might not have added his signature.

It was the prime object in the diplomacy of the neutral nations to make Central Europe a unit, unassailable in its neutrality, decisive in its final action. Austria had some aims of her own, which it was determined to secure by guaranty,

* "All honorable retreat was peremptorily cut off by an imperious summons, which Russia never before received in the whole period of her history, even at a time when a conqueror, at the head of armed Europe, invaded her territory." — Russian Manifesto, April, 1854.

and to some extent her interests coincided with those of all Germany. "Everybody knows what Austria wants," said Count Nesselrode; it was in truth no secret; she wanted the Principalities and the free navigation of the Danube. Accordingly, the first move in Germany was a treaty negotiated at Berlin by General Hess on the part of Austria, securing the aid of Prussia if she were attacked in the Principalities, or if a Russian army advanced to the Balkan. But upon analysis it was found that the treaty was imperfect, as it pledged the assistance of Prussia only in case Austria were attacked on territory then in her possession. Austria once in the Principalities, the engagement was good for nothing. And it was not until November 26, that a separate article was added, by which Frederic William bound himself to aid the Emperor of Austria if attacked in his dominions or in the Principalities. The Germanic Diet acceded to the first treaty on the 26th of July; to the separate article, December 9. The importance of the adhesion of the Confederation consists in the fact, that it controls an army of a quarter of a million, independent of the armies of the two great powers. Thus during the year 1854, while her statesmen were deliberately surveying the field, and awaiting indications for action, Germany was so bound together by treaties, that an attack on any member of its political family, by either belligerent, would have provoked the whole weight of its power, with an army of a million and a half of disciplined soldiers.

The siege of Silistria occupied the same place in the public attention during the spring and summer of last year which Sevastopol now fills. The town was invested by Prince Paskievitch on the 11th of May, and its successful resistance, while it gave the Turks a reputation they have almost lost by subsequent events, undoubtedly suggested to the Russians the hint of the gigantic earth-works, which have since made Sevastopol impregnable. The town of Silistria, lying upon the right bank of the Danube, is fortified on the land side by a semicircular earth-work, presenting a defensive line of about two thousand yards. This fortification alone resisted, in 1829, a Russian army encamped on the heights overlooking and commanding the town, at the distance of a thousand

yards, for thirty-five days. During the recent siege, the Turks themselves held these heights, intrenched behind detached earth-works, not one of which did the Russians ever succeed in carrying. An assault was attempted against the principal work on the 24th of May, and another at midnight of the 28th. In the last the garrison was surprised, and the Russians nearly got possession of the fortification. Foiled in these attempts, the besiegers resorted to more tedious but surer expedients. Four separate mines were sprung under the parapet, and an assault was made after each explosion. The Turks, however, listening to the progress of the miners, threw up another intrenchment, withdrew their guns, and mounted them on the new rampart, so as to command the breach. But Silistria was invested in the strictest sense, and consequently its fall was but a question of time. It is now thought it could not have held out forty-eight hours longer, when suddenly, on the 22d of June, the siege-works were arrested, and the next day the Russian army was in full retreat. The movement was effected in good order; the leading families of the Principalities withdrew with the head-quarters of the army beyond the Pruth, and Prince Gortchakoff issued a proclamation, inflated to a degree not warranted by his military success, announcing that the retreat was for strategic reasons, and that he would return. The true reason soon appeared. With the consent of the Allies, Austria had signed a convention with the Porte on the 14th of June, binding herself to hold the Principalities during the war, and to give them back to her at the restoration of peace. It must be confessed the affair was accomplished very leisurely. The evacuation was not complete till September, and it was ten weeks before an Austrian army descended from the North into Wallachia. It is commonly said, and very probably the assertion will soon be repeated, to make out a case of treachery against Austria, that Omar Pacha was prevented by her from following the Russians. The story, besides being untrue, is absurd. General Hess informed the Turkish commander that the Austrian arrangements should not interfere with his movements; but when asked his own opinion, he did not advise him to hazard a campaign in an open country against superior forces. The

truth is, that while no Turkish army has of late years exhibited any insane alacrity in fighting Russians in open field, at this time Omar Pacha's army was already disorganized for want of pay, supplies, and reinforcements. With the Austrian occupation the defence of Turkish territory in Europe was effected, and one object of the war had no longer to be sought.

In July the Austrian Cabinet informed the Germanic Diet that it saw an important element of pacification, and possibly a basis of negotiation, in recent communications from St. Petersburg, and while the Russian envoy at Vienna was announcing that the Emperor Nicholas was about to order a complete evacuation of Moldo-Wallachia, the *Moniteur* stated that notes had been exchanged indicating that Austria, as well as England and France, looked to "guaranties" from Russia to prevent a return of complications, and that, while France would not grant an armistice, she was disposed to treat upon the following bases:—(1.) Abolition of the Russian protectorate over Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia. (2.) Liberty of the mouths of the Danube. (3.) Revision of the treaty of 1841, in what concerns the limits of Russia in the Black Sea. (4.) Renunciation by the Emperor of Russia of all protectorate over Ottoman subjects. These articles, which are the originals of the "Four Points," were drawn up by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and were the *minima* of demands. France and England declining to make any overture in their own names, the proposals indorsed by Prussia and Austria in the note of August 8th were sent to St. Petersburg, and were rejected; upon which Austria, in the circular of September 30th, maintained the four "guaranties," but insisted upon the point, that she had not any more than Prussia engaged to enforce their acceptance by arms; and she withdrew her request for the immediate mobilization of the federal contingent, and her proposition before the Diet to have the four guaranties introduced into the Prussian treaty of April 20th.

The war had been heralded by a project which somewhat transcended these points, and we know of no better time to introduce it than in the interval which elapsed between the rejection of the August note and its conditional acceptance

in November. War was hardly declared, when a remarkable paper appeared, attributed to the hand of the Emperor Napoleon himself. It argued that, as diplomacy and long-suffering had failed to disarm an ambition threatening to Europe, the war, become inevitable, ought to be energetic and decisive. Its propositions were few and simple. Finland gives Russia the control of the Baltic, the Crimea makes her mistress of the Black Sea, and Poland renders her oppressive to Germany. It assumes that the weakness of the Cabinet of Louis XV. permitted the first dismemberment of Turkey, and the first partition of Poland, to the profit of Russia; that the revolutionary agitations of 1792 prevented France from opposing the second dismemberment and partition of Turkey and Poland, and that it was reserved for the France of 1854, "tranquil under a strong government," to repair the errors of the last century. The disinterested attitude of France and England, about which there could be no doubt, authorizes them therefore to open the question of a revision of the map of Europe. It was proposed to "suffocate Russia by throwing back the blood from the extremities to the heart"; the head of the Colossus being at Helsingfors, its right arm at Warsaw, its feet at Sevastopol. Therefore Finland was to be given back to Sweden, Poland was to be transferred to Prussia, and the Crimea and the Trans-Caucasus to be restored to Turkey. Austria was to be paid with the Principalities and Bessarabia, and was to transfer Lombardy to Sardinia. Compelled to restore the usurpations of a century, "the aggressor" only would suffer from an arrangement everywhere to be made at his expense. The "dismemberment of Turkey," suggested as a contingency, sinks to insignificance compared with this bold attempt to disorganize Europe. The pamphlet itself was "suppressed," but somehow it contrived to see the light, and not long after, the "*Le Pays*" newspaper argued the same points. Moreover, one or another of these several schemes has been under discussion ever since, as freely as if Russia were overrun by French soldiers. The question of authorship is not a very material one, but there have already transpired some events to indicate what was the ulterior aim of the war. (1.) Bomar-

sund and the Åland Islands, so important to Finland, were captured, and offered to Sweden, who declined the dangerous gift. (2.) Austria has got the Principalities, and has dallied an entire year with France and England. (3.) Russia kept in Poland two hundred thousand of her best troops, at a time when she could send only third-rate soldiers to the Crimea. (4.) Sardinia was seduced into the alliance, under the expectation that the war was to be a European one, and, probably with the hope of getting Lombardy, has sent its little contingent to die of cholera before Sevastopol. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to suppose that if Finland and Poland, the Crimea and the Caucasus, could have been got, they would have been kept. The document derives its importance, not from its *quasi* official character, but because it anticipates and includes all the expedients of chastisement and humiliation which have been suggested. It is not to be doubted that Russia at this moment owes the integrity of her empire to something else than a want of inclination on the part of her enemies to destroy its vitality. It is with questionable taste that England could demand the restoration of the annexations mentioned. In 1783 France solicited the union of England in a remonstrance to Russia against the acquisition of Kuban Tartary and the Crimea. Ministers replied, that his Majesty would make no remonstrance, and throw no obstacles in the way of the Empress, and they communicated the proposition of the court of Versailles to St. Petersburg, to gain favor with Catharine. So Turkey was dismembered, and the Caucasus and the Crimea were absorbed by Russia. In 1792 England, through Mr. Pitt, destroyed the confederacy which would have prevented the partition of Poland, to secure the aid of Russia against France. In 1815 she threatened Denmark with war and another bombardment of Copenhagen, if she presumed to resist the spoliation of Norway, which was given to Sweden to secure Alexander in the possession of Finland. It is hardly necessary to add, that these plans, as well as the "appeal to nationalities," which was once supposed to be something more than an unmeaning phrase, were very judiciously expunged from the programme some time before the last conference at Vienna.

Early in the autumn of 1854, Baron de Budburgh, the Russian envoy at Berlin, intimated that, while the Emperor Nicholas would not accept the four points, pure and simple, he was willing to consider them as bases of negotiation, and to enter into immediate communication on them with Austria. This was followed by an official announcement. The Emperor, affirming his constant love of peace and his good-will towards Germany, declared that, "yielding to the pressing recommendations of Prussia, and to spare Germany all division and embarrassment," he was cordially ready to accept the four preliminaries, reserving the right of an explanation of each; for example, that the "protection" indicated in the first and fourth points should be guaranteed by the Five Powers with a common understanding; that as to the second point he had never intended to obstruct the navigation of the Danube; that as to the third, a revision of treaties was demanded by actual circumstances and desirable for both parties. In view of the fact that the terms of peace had emanated from a general conference, Austria was not willing to enter alone into the discussion. We should hardly suppose that the prospect of pacification was materially aided by the subsequent declaration of the French and English ambassadors at Vienna, that, "in the march of events, the Allied Powers would reserve the right of giving to the four points an extension proportioned to the situation, and of adding to them many points commanded either by the sacrifices they had made, or for the security of Europe, menaced by the obstinacy of Russia."

A few days after the second treaty with Prussia and Germany was signed, Austria, having been constantly plied since the August note to join the policy of the Allies, went so far as to sign a treaty, which in our judgment, by the false expectations springing from it, has been productive of more mischief than any single event of the war. The treaty of the 2d of December was at once publicly announced in Paris and London to be an act of hostility to Russia, and the preliminary of an inevitable rupture between the two courts. From that time till the suspension of the conferences, Western Europe never ceased to hope that, if all Germany did not

join them, at least Austria would add her forces to theirs, and rumor specified the figure of her contingent to the Crimea. But we believe it was very far from the intention of Count Buol-Schauenstein, a diplomatist upon whom the mantle of Metternich and Schwartzzenburgh has fallen, to commit Austria to any position likely to involve her in war, not of her own will, for ends which might be obtained without war. We believe that the sole object of the treaty of December 2, so carefully worded, was to secure to Austria an attitude of authority in the approaching conferences, from which she could better guard the interests of Germany and her own, and secure the prize she already held within her grasp. It is no part of our purpose to indulge, however cautiously, in speculation or in attributing motives, but this theory is the one best supported by the text, as explained by the antecedents and the results, of the treaty. Its hostility is only verbal. In case negotiations failed, Austria was to deliberate in common with the Allies as to the best means of effecting their object. It was frankly stated in Parliament, before its provisions were published, that there was nothing in it to preclude Austria from continuing her neutrality in any event. When Prussia was invited to accede to it on the condition of her ultimate co-operation, Baron de Manteuffel asked if the Three Powers were willing to interpret the basis, and was answered, No. The court of Berlin therefore held itself aloof, but sent Baron Von Usedom and General Wedel to London and Paris on a special mission, which failed.

Events marched, in the significant phrase of the French minister. When the Austro-Turkish convention rendered it prudent for Russia to retreat to her own soil, and left nothing farther to be done in defence of the territory of the Sultan, the allied commanders in the East were directed by their respective governments to procure all possible information respecting the strength of Russia in the Crimea, and to concert measures for the siege of Sevastopol; the English Minister of War adding in his despatch, "There is no hope of a safe and honorable peace until the fortress is reduced, and the fleet taken and destroyed." The torrents of grandiloquence which have deluged the war-literature and journal-

ism of the past year do not go beyond that simple phrase of the honest, if incapable, Duke of Newcastle. It was the creed of the nation, the latest and grandest object of the war. We shall not argue the question, if a durable peace might not have been secured without an aggression upon Russian territory, however such a moderate course might harmonize with the first purpose of the Allies. England, considering that Russia had never invaded her soil, and that she herself never had known the worst horrors of war, however often and ruthlessly she may have inflicted them on others, might have discouraged the enterprise. But while Russia by her own mode of warfare can claim no exemption from the ordinary hazards of a belligerent, certainly she could ask no favor from the heir of him whom a Cossack Emperor had dethroned. And besides, the expedition did not sail till the Emperor had rejected the August protocols. Conceding then the perfect propriety, under the circumstances, of the invasion, its expediency has been doubted. It is but a vulgar way of appreciating the merits of an enterprise, to look exclusively at results. Certainly it is not pretended that a citadel can be made absolutely impregnable. Had the enterprise against Sevastopol succeeded, it would have become historical as the boldest strategic operation the world has seen. It has failed, and failed in the hands of some of the best generals of the age. It was not within human foresight to know that in the service of the enemy was a young colonel of engineers, whose intuition and genius in a few weeks would transform the defenceless side of the city into a vast chain of earthen ramparts more formidable than the gigantic masonry on which millions had been expended, and against which they dared not advance. It would have been an insult to the common sense of both nations to have proposed originally an army of two hundred thousand men to take a single fortified city. At the same time, it is not to be questioned that the fatal habit of over-estimating their own military prowess, and underrating the courage, skill, and resources of the enemy, has contributed largely to the disastrous termination of the siege.* Both cabinets were confident of

* We write this in the middle of August, but we do not apprehend anything to make this expression premature.

success, and it was the universal opinion that Sevastopol would fall by a *coup de main*. The public were prepared for false intelligence, and it has been given them with a liberal hand from that day to this.

Holding with an invincible fleet the control of the Black Sea, with almost unlimited reinforcements within forty hours' sail, and no rear to protect, an army of sixty thousand men was landed on the western coast of the Crimea without accident or resistance, and in its march southward upon the fortress, found itself on the 22d of September in front of the enemy, posted in a powerful position on the left bank of a little stream opposite the village of Alma-serai. It was the first time the gallant forces of the two nations, whose hereditary rivalry never burned fiercer than in this contest for laurels in each other's presence, had met the despised and calumniated foe. The fleet accompanied the army along the coast, protecting its right wing, which consisted of the French, the Turkish contingent of eight thousand being placed between them and the British on the left. The Zouaves commenced the attack, and in an hour and a half had, with the aid of the firing from the fleet, got possession of the heights next the sea, and turned the enemy's left. The main body of the allied army, including the British division, then came into action, and in less than five hours the position was carried, and the Russian army was in full retreat. The balance of loss, we suppose, must have been against the retreating body. But the Russians retired deliberately, leaving only two disabled guns in the hands of the Allies, who bivouacked upon the field. Menchikoff withdrew his whole army in good order upon Simferopol, whence he commanded the rear of the Allies in case they should attack the northern forts. Victory was with the Allies, yet it was something that the inferior Crimean army had fought for five hours double their number of select soldiery, protected by a powerful fleet and possessed of the latest improvements in military science. The two causes of the failure of the campaign of 1854 since assigned by the Emperor Napoleon, were the sinking of the ships in the harbor of Sevastopol, and the retreat of Menchikoff to Simferopol instead of shutting himself up in the fortress. The

first liberated six hundred guns, with their gunners and ammunition, for the southern defences; the second compelled the invaders to sit down before these defences in regular siege.

From the point of departure intimated in the title of this article, the military history of the war is secondary, and subservient to the diplomatic. But it is of the last importance that the actual successes of the parties should be presented without disguise or misrepresentation. The theory which serves the purpose of a recruiting sergeant is not that to be presented to the intelligent and impartial judgment of a neutral nation. In every English disquisition on this war that we have read, a by no means unpleasant phantom of "British gallantry" has crept in and obscured the whole question quite as effectually as "Mr. Dick's" "head of Charles the First," in that most unsatisfactory of "memorials." We fancy that, if any little delusion once existed as to the courage and loyalty of the Russian soldier, it has long ago been dispelled; and it is not among the least of the triumphs of the brave fellows before Sevastopol, that their evidence, got from many a fearful encounter, has compelled a dastardly and ignorant press to retract its long-sustained libels. It was in truth but vilifying their own army to depreciate the valor of an enemy from whom it had suffered so much.

The army not being large enough to invest the city, as was said, but in reality, as we think, lacking the requisite force to attempt the *coup de main*, the reported success of which is now fastened historically in the guise of a "hoax" upon a mythical "Tartar," marched by flank towards the southern capes, the English by choice occupying Balaklava, the French much nearer the scene of operations holding Kamiesch Bay, which commands an observation of Sevastopol. The Allies found that new batteries had sprung up as if by enchantment. Fire was opened, on the morning of the 17th of October, from one hundred and twenty guns, including the much vaunted siege artillery of the French army. At about one o'clock the French division of the allied fleet commenced a bombardment of the marine forts, and within two hours the whole allied fleet was drawn up and in action, and continued to

fire till night. But it is now notorious, that by far the greater part of the vessels were anchored out of range. Although it was telegraphed home that the fire of the ships had silenced or blown up Fort Constantine and the Quarantine Battery, it was not thought prudent, from the accidents which happened on board the ships within range, to renew the marine attack, and the fleet has consequently not appeared upon the scene again. The French batteries, distant from the Russian six hundred yards, were silenced in a few hours; the English, firing from nearly double that distance, received little serious injury, and inflicted less, if any. The advantage at the end of the first day's firing was everywhere with the besieged, and continued with them during eight days, in which time one hundred and fifty thousand projectiles had been thrown into the city. On the 25th of October, it was shown that a large Russian army, independent of the garrison, was in the field, and the whole plan of the siege was changed. The British had intrusted their outposts to the Turks. Early on the morning of the 25th, the Ottoman heroes were driven in "like sheep" by a Russian detachment, and the four redoubts held by them were captured. The "Charge of the Light Brigade," now a luminous point in history, has had the effect of throwing into obscurity all the disasters of that day. But it is no longer denied that the battle of Balaklava was in every sense, in the fact and the results, a Russian victory. Liprandi's army kept possession of the redoubts, destroyed two of them, captured nine guns, remained drawn up on the field in order of battle only fifteen hundred yards from the British, and took and held the road leading into Sevastopol in one direction and into the mountains in the other; and to the loss of this battle is now candidly attributed much of the misery of the winter campaign. With the exception of a brilliant dash of the Chasseurs d'Afrique, which by silencing a Russian battery saved the remnant of the British horse from destruction, the brunt of the day fell upon the English army.

But it was not till after the "frightful hazards of Inkermann" that the besiegers became the besieged, and the truth came to be known. Then it was seen for the first time, by

the English government at least, that the army, for whose subsistence supplies had actually been demanded for "Malta and back," must winter without preparation in the Crimea. To the "soldiers' battle," in which the English lost one man in three out of the eight thousand who were engaged, and were saved only by the arrival of a French division under General Bosquet, succeeded the storm of the 16th of November.* In two days some thirty or forty transports were wrecked, and the crews and equipments of these, thrown on shore, captured by the Cossacks. The hundred gun-ships, the *Henri IV.* and the *Pluton*, were lost, and what was of more consequence than all, the transport ship *Prince* went down with all the winter clothing of the British army. Then the long Crimean winter set in, with its not half-told horrors. The heroes of three battles fought in rapid succession, in every one of which the honor of Old England had been upheld as bravely as by the mailed knights of the Crusades, ragged and starved, huddled together in muddy trenches, heart-broken with weariness and neglect, were taken out by dozens dead day after day; or, more shameful still, bloody and scarred with the lash for not fighting off sleep forty and fifty hours at a time, deserted in such crowds as to furnish a "strong contingent" to the Russian army. Less was known of the hardships of the French. From their perfect administration and their proximity to a convenient landing, it is to be supposed there was no actual suffering; but we learn from the speech of the Emperor himself, that they by no means escaped the misfortunes which more than decimated their allies.

The mishaps and misdeeds of the British campaign in the Crimea are purely local matters; we have nothing to do with the distribution of censure; it is quite sufficient to accept the parliamentary affirmation of Lord Derby, that "the campaign of 1854 was a total and disgraceful failure," and that of Mr. Dickens as to the popular conviction, that "thereby the country

* There are some discrepancies in the accounts of the battle of Inkermann which we shall not attempt to reconcile. That of the Allies is well known, some 10,000 Russians being killed out of 60,000 engaged. Menchikoff describes it as two sorties, in which 22,000 men were engaged, out of whom about 7,000 were killed or wounded.

is plunged in the deepest distress and disgrace." But an important truth has been elicited from the evidence before the Sevastopol Committee. It appears that the persons whose duty it was to keep government informed of the state of the army, for a long time sent mendacious reports which lulled the apprehensions of the War Office, so that when "correspondents" first revealed the actual horrors of the case, their statements were repelled by ministers as the malicious inventions of a "ribald press"; and it was not till they received confirmation of them from unquestionable private sources, that government ceased to deny them in the most indignant terms. And the dullest intellect now contrasts the bombastic inaccuracies of the allied generals, even of the brave St. Arnaud, with the modest, succinct, and faithful despatches of the Russian commanders.

Confining ourselves to such an outline of military and naval operations as will indicate the real proportion of success and defeat, and the consequent position of the belligerents with regard to negotiations for peace, we have little to say of the naval exploits of the Allies. Bomarsund was destroyed by a French force of some ten or twelve thousand men and a corps of engineers, its little garrison of two thousand made prisoners, and the fortifications, having been declined with the offer of the Aland Islands by Sweden, blown up. The fortresses of the Gulf of Finland and Cronstadt bade defiance to the great armament which whitened the waters beneath them far as the eye could reach. In a remote corner of the world, on the coast of Kamtschatka, the almost unknown fortress of Petropaulovski repelled an unforeseen attack of six English and French frigates, and drove back with loss a detachment of marines which had landed for the assault. The ravaging of a defenceless coast, burning and sinking of private property, destruction of fishing villages, though unhappily not at variance with the laws of maritime warfare, could necessarily be only imperfectly appreciated by the chivalry of Central Europe.

There is one event which is to be classed among the successes of the Allies, and which was an unhappy necessity of the triple alliance. But if it is true that there has been a

time when the act in question would have been differently viewed by Christian nations, the injury was amply recompensed by the terms of the treaty of alliance, and by the provisions of the "fourth point." We allude to the repression of the Greek insurrection. The Christian population of the southwestern provinces of Turkey took advantage of the war with Russia, and revolted against their hereditary tyrants, proclaiming boldly a renewal of the war of 1821. Oaths were taken that they would not lay down their arms till their oppressors were driven from the land. They declared that the war was holy and just, and that no one who considered the weight of their burdens would offer to defend their barbarian oppressors; "that they could no longer bear the violation of all law, the pillage of their property, and the dishonor of their daughters." The court of King Otho was suspected of aiding the insurrection, and he was threatened with a change of dynasty unless a complete neutrality were at once declared. A French division and an English regiment took possession of the gun-boats in the harbor, and landed on the Peiræus. The chivalrous queen, almost maddened at the sight, threatened to take horse, cross the frontier, place herself at the head of the army, and rouse the population to arms; and she was deterred only by the entreaties and even tears of the more placable king. A neutrality was extorted, the insurrection quelled, and the insurgent villages laid waste with fire and sword.

While we have detailed every material event likely to influence the question of peace, it is to be added, that preparations were making all winter for a decisive blow. Count Walewski has since admitted that "France and England lent themselves to negotiations at a moment when it appears that the active pursuit of the war ought to be the principal object of their care and attention," which, the Russian journals maintain, accounts for the fact that the negotiations were delayed till the Allies could try the chance of another campaign; and explains also the extreme reluctance with which their envoys could be brought to enter into the preliminary discussions. On the 28th of December, Count Buol-Schauenstein, the Earl of Westmoreland, and the Baron de Bourqueney drafted

a protocol, specifying precisely the sense to be attached to the four points; and Count Buol took the document to Prince Gortchakoff, and asked him if he was ready to accept those conditions without modification or reserve. The Prince requested fourteen days in which to communicate with St. Petersburg; but five days before the expiration of the time, he announced that his master adhered to the four guaranties as defined and explained in the ultimatum. As the Russian circular of August 28th had declined the note of the 8th, on the ground that its proposals involved the material and moral abasement of Russia, we may infer that the explanations contained nothing humiliating. It was understood, in fact, that no allusion had been made to Sevastopol or the fleet. Prussia, being denied a seat at the Conference, consoled herself with the sympathy of the Germanic Diet, which accepted all her propositions concerning the federal army, and rejected those of Austria. She at the same time refused to allow a French army to pass through her territory.

At the preliminary meetings verbal explanations were made on each point; the Russian envoys stating that they would reserve discussion upon their interpretation until the official opening. Meantime an event occurred which for the moment baffled all the calculations of diplomacy. Almost without warning, the Emperor Nicholas died. The unbending man, whose pride was something more than the dignity springing out of his relations to a great and loyal empire, was taken away, and the rancor of his enemies could no longer denounce *him* as an obstacle to the repose of Europe. The "personality" of the war ceased. The more respectable journals in England returned to the language of civilized life; the hideous caricature in a weekly print, which shocked and mortified the better portion of the nation, was not repeated; and the theatrical manager whose dramatic announcement of the death of the Emperor caused the innate brutality of at least *his* audience to betray itself in tumultuous applause, was compelled to disown his share in the proceeding even at the expense of truth. The French police rigorously interfered with such rejoicings in Paris, and the *Moniteur* significantly announced, that "a great nation like France does not rejoice

when *death* strikes down an enemy, powerful as he may be." The new Emperor Alexander II. asked the blessing of God and the aid of his subjects in his endeavors "to raise Russia to the highest degree of glory, and to realize the wishes of Peter, Catharine, Alexander, and Nicholas."

The conference opened at last on the 15th of March, less than a fortnight after the death of Nicholas. The Western envoys repeated the determination of their governments to "pursue the career of sacrifice" (that is, to carry on the war) till the four points should be placed in the public law of Europe, and they reserved the right of making special conditions over and above them as the interests of Europe might require. Prince Gortchakoff trusted that they had a common object in wishing to secure a general peace, which, he added, could not be lasting or have any practical value unless honorable to both parties, and he declared, moreover, that if it were attempted to impose conditions incompatible with the honor of Russia, he would not consent to them, however serious might be the consequences of refusal. Lord John Russell recognized this as the only condition on which the negotiations could proceed, by declaring in Parliament before his departure for Vienna that it was not the intention of the two courts to propose any conditions injurious to the honor and dignity of Russia. It remains to be seen if the governments and people of France and England did or did not entertain the expectation that the war they were engaged in would terminate in the humiliation of Russia. It is to be seen also if on their part there was any hope or any desire that the Conference should enunciate peace, and upon whom rests the responsibility of its rupture,—an act which prolongs the misery of war to an indefinite extent, has produced new combinations, and justified new conclusions and sympathies.

The first two points referring almost exclusively to German interests, the Western envoys did not enter deeply into their discussion. Yielded freely and unreservedly by Russia, there was yet considerable delay in arranging the details of their settlement. With respect to the first, Russia consented to the abrogation of all the rights and privileges wrung from Turkey in a series of successful wars. Her exclusive protec-

torate over the Principalities was abolished, their future condition was to be regulated by a special act of the Porte maintaining their civil and religious liberties, and Prince Gortchakoff and M. de Titoff were very earnest in insisting that their franchises should be in no way abridged. The second point was still more easily settled. Russia asserts that it is not diplomacy, but assiduous labor, day by day, that is to remove obstacles accumulated by the silent efforts of nature. In this spirit it was determined that the navigation of the Danube should be regulated by the principles applied in 1815 to the great navigable rivers of Europe. Russia gave up her quarantine at the Sulina mouth, and promised not to erect fortifications between the channels of Sulina and St. George. The free navigation of the river was to be protected by a commission established by all the powers. These two points the Emperor still regards as definitely settled, and has informed all the German courts that he intends to adhere to them so long as Germany preserves its neutrality, notwithstanding the rupture of the conference.

The third point has grown out of the war itself. It is one of those ulterior objects which the act of war justifies a belligerent in making a condition of peace, but which the other party is not morally bound to accept as if it were an original *casus belli*; all its moral support, therefore, must be derived from unmistakable and signal success. It is not pretended that this point commanded such a prestige at Vienna, and its acceptance by Russia, even as a point of departure, is a gratuitous concession. The basis was drawn up by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and it was first alluded to in public a little while after the Austro-Turkish convention. The third point is really twofold, and has been divided into a first and second part. The first part proposes to connect Turkey with the European equilibrium. An article was promptly agreed to, by which the contracting parties severally engaged themselves to respect the independence and territorial integrity of Turkey, and to guarantee the observance of the contract, pronouncing any act of a nature to infringe it "an event of European interest." It was, moreover, unanimously established, that, if a conflict should arise between

the Porte and any one of the powers, the two states before resorting to force should offer to the other powers the opportunity of preventing such an extremity by pacific means. Thus an explicit engagement was made by Russia, in common with the other powers, not to attack Turkey in any event without the knowledge, and virtually the consent, of the rest. The communication of any difficulty to the two great naval powers, for instance, to which Russia pledges herself before committing an act of war, will enable them to fill the Black Sea with their ships; for the plan which Russia proposed to settle the second part was to open that sea, or to close it, giving the Sultan power to call in foreign navies at any time. Over and above this engagement, every guaranty made to secure the object of the first part of the third point is therefore supererogatory. The assumption that Russia intends to play false to her treaty obligations, is an argument against all treaties with her, and if the assumption were well founded, it would justify the employment of every means to cripple and disable her, so as to deprive her of all power to inflict injury in any direction.

The second part of the third point was intended to be the peg upon which the Western nations were to hang all their "additional demands" having reference to the interests of Europe. Had Sweden joined the Allies and accepted the Åland Islands, the interests of Europe of course would have required the restoration of Finland. Had Central Europe departed from its neutrality in their favor, the same high considerations would have demanded the annexation of the Grand Duchy of Posen to the Prussian crown. Had Sevastopol fallen, the exalted morality which presided at the dictation of these terms of peace would have seen no hope for civilization till the Crimea, which had relapsed into Christianity, was restored to the religious and political advantages of the Crescent, and Russia, whose political existence seems to be an unaccountable mistake, would have been compelled to export her wheat and her barbarism at a single undefended port, which, as often as it exhibited an undue commercial activity, could be laid in ashes by a small fleet and at a trifling expense. We are writing sober words. These projects,

in detail and as a whole, for arresting the civilization of Russia, and throwing her back upon her original barbarism, have been promulgated by the press, the literature, and the statesmen of France and England. It was not until the complete and ignominious failure of the first campaign, that the discussion of them ceased to encourage and inflame the hopes of the populace of the two nations. Events had *retrograded*. Not even Sevastopol was mentioned at Vienna.

The great event for which the conference had been so long delayed, took place during the sitting. Profiting by the errors which had caused the unfortunate result of the first bombardment, the French had intersected the whole space before them with parallels, and were within two hundred yards of the Russian works. With no less confidence than before, the least sanguine of the besiegers had not the temerity to suppose that the city could resist the storm ready to burst over it, and preparations were again made for the assault. Before daylight on the 6th of April, nearly four hundred mouths opened their fire, at the rate of one hundred and twenty rounds a day each; the heaviest weight of metal ever thrown in a siege. The Russians, surprised, did not reply for nearly an hour, which enabled the besiegers to correct their "practice," but then replied with such vigor as to demonstrate that they still retained a superiority, though comparatively not so crushing as in October. The defence received no injury not immediately repaired; the Allies at no moment gained a superiority of fire, took not a single position, nor destroyed a single work. So little annoyed was the garrison, that in a few weeks they commenced a new work of counter-approach. The second bombardment continued ten days; no breach was effected nor battery silenced, and consequently no assault could be attempted. The failure was not lost upon even the allied plenipotentiaries, as will appear in the sequel.

Foreseeing the difficulties in "limiting the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea," which was the aim of the second part of the third point, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, Lord John Russell, and Ali Pacha had been sent to assist at the deliberations, while the Russian envoys were also awaiting

further instructions from St. Petersburg. Austria and Russia proposed to go on to the fourth point, — the protection of Christian subjects of the Porte; but France and England absolutely refused. Count Nesselrode has ventured to explain the significance of their refusal. He asserts that, while Russia was ready to accept unreservedly the interpretation of the Allies on this point, the settlement was such an infringement of the independence of the Sultan, that his ambassador would have remonstrated, and the odium of the rupture would have been thrown upon Turkey. However this may be, it is not the less true, and it is not the less to be kept out of sight, that this point, being the original cause of war, was the one on which Russia had expressed her willingness to yield finally and fully all the rights and claims, “moderate and just in themselves,” “prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty,” for at one time insisting upon which she had become involved in this war. By applying to the third point an interpretation she had, in general terms, already declined to accept, the opportunity was taken from her of showing so much of a desire for peace as consisted in an unqualified retreat from the attitude which had provoked hostilities in the first instance.

Prince Gortchakoff, declining the initiative in proposing a solution of the second section of the difficult point, announced that he would take into serious consideration any means not of a nature to infringe the rights of sovereignty of the Emperor of Russia in his own dominions; and to a question of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, he stated that “Russia would not consent to the strength of her navy being restricted to any fixed number, either by treaty or any other means.” It was then that Lord John’s unlucky allusion to Dunkirk elicited the sarcastic retort, that “a first-rate power could hardly accept such limitation, except after a long series of disasters, and that the case of Dunkirk could in no way be applied to the position of Russia.” Excluding a single point from discussion, the Russian envoys were ready to examine all other modes of settlement. We have already affirmed, that, having yielded every other point insisted upon by the Allies, Russia was under no sort of moral obligation to limit her

forces by land or sea. Every argument, like that for instance of Count Buol, resting upon the assumption that the Euxine is a closed sea, is radically fallacious, in the fact that at any moment it can be opened and filled with the enemies of either Russia or Turkey. The security of Turkey, so far as it can be made dependent upon treaties, was already guaranteed in the most solemn manner. If it is assumed that Russia intends to break one treaty, why not another? It was demonstrated in Parliament that nothing was easier than for Russia to evade an obligation to limit the number of her ships of war. We will not detail the various shifts, reflecting so much credit as they do upon the ingenious casuists who suggested them. At the conference, Prince Gortchakoff read a paper to show that Turkey was in no danger from the naval forces of Russia. He then proposed, (1.) that the Dardanelles should be open to the military flags of all nations; or, (2.) that they should be closed at the pleasure of the Porte. The Allies refused to consider these plans, and the Russian envoy announced that his instructions were exhausted.

The diminution of the Russian preponderance may be effected in two ways, — by equipoise or by limitation. The first is included in the Russian proposition. The objections to this plan, as presented by the Allies, are, that it is unsafe, and that it is burdensome; the first of which objections is untrue, the second fallacious. It is not true that Russia, being only the third naval power of Europe, can in a circumscribed field, under the surveillance of the other powers, so develop her strength, as to defy and attack their navies combined with that of the Ottoman empire (for a concert of the European powers is supposed in each of the other guaranties); and it is a fallacy that it would be burdensome for the Allies to spare two or three vessels from their overgrown navies to observe Russia in the Euxine. England and France would thus be put to no additional expense whatever. The idea of safety lurking at the bottom of the plan of limitation, supposing it to be honest, is, after all, that Russia, with two or three ships more or less, in a time of profound peace, bound by solemn treaties to keep that peace, can suddenly,

and before the lightning can flash a warning to the Mediterranean, take and hold possession of an empire of thirty-five millions of subjects, distributed on two continents, and sure of the support, in case of such an emergency, of an armed hemisphere, and its two millions of bayonets; a proposition which few minds can hear stated with patience. There can be no other construction than just this of the "guaranty" involved in the limitation of the Russian navy to a fixed number.

But is it possible that so transparent an absurdity could have obtruded itself into the programme of the over-matched plenipotentiaries of Western Europe? By no means. If the drift of this plain narrative, now drawing to a close, shall have been comprehended in all its relations, it will be seen, without any reasoning of our own, that an object of war, ulterior to Ottoman independence and integrity of territory, has been developed in the diplomacy of the self-styled friends of Turkey, and so far the enemies of Russia. That object is to cripple and to humble the power with whom they fortuitously found themselves at war. Incompetent to accomplish the physical feat, it remained only to intimidate or inveigle Russia into an act of self-abasement, as an offset to their own failure in the attempt to gain a purely military triumph. It counted for nothing then, in this view, that all the objects for which the war was begun were gained, and that all the additional demands which sprang up in its progress were yielded. Few persons have ever doubted that it was expedient and proper for Turkey to take up arms for the abrogation of treaties which contained the elements of her own destruction. No one has doubted that it was just and necessary that France and England should aid her in accomplishing that object. The only question to be determined is, whether those powers have not transcended the legitimate purpose of the war.

We have proceeded thus far upon the assumption that the Emperor of Russia, without having, in a strict sense, been vanquished in the conflict, has conceded four out of five (separating the third point into its two parts) of the conditions of peace; and that those four conditions are so closely con-

nected with the whole end to be attained, as entirely to obviate the necessity of the fifth. It is not reasonable, therefore, to demand that in addition he shall consent to a proposition which, useless and superfluous in the sense of security, by common consent, notwithstanding the fallacies and sophistry intended to disguise its true character till the moment of its concession, is derogatory to the dignity and honor of his empire. But there is something to be added, which makes the responsibility of those who are relentlessly prolonging this war for an unlawful object more terrible in the eyes of the civilized world.

It is now beyond dispute, that terms of peace were proposed by the Austrian plenipotentiary at the conference, which in the opinion of every member of that conference, not excepting the Turkish ambassador, were equally efficacious and honorable. Those terms rest upon the principles both of equipoise and limitation. It is beyond dispute, too, that the Austrian government declared that, if they were not accepted at St. Petersburg, it would consider it a cause of war; and Russia now declares that she would have so accepted them. The governments of England and France have repudiated the act of their envoys, and declared that the war shall go on to the bitter end. And that end for which a quarter of a million of men are engaged in daily and murderous war, for which defenceless coasts, and the peaceful marts of commerce, and temples of art, and quiet homes, are ravaged with a merciless barbarity unparalleled in the history of civilized warfare, is — tell it not in Christendom — that by transferring two ships, more or less, from the Euxine to the Baltic, the great Russian nation shall confess it has been beaten in the conflict.

The question, which party ought to receive the sympathies of the American nation, is one into the discussion of which we do not propose to enter. It has been our only aim to present such a series of incontestable facts as will enable every candid and intelligent mind to determine for itself what has been right and what has been wrong in the whole matter, from beginning to end. The vulgar notion, that everything that one nation does is well done, and everything that another does

is wrong, is an element not likely to obtrude itself upon such a mind. Time has already stripped the subject of its theatricals, and torn away its shams. Many a noble sentiment in the manifesto has sunk into a senseless phrase, and the fustian declamation which heralded the contest has lost its fashion in the capitals of Europe, and, like other last year's goods, is consigned exclusively to the provincial markets. It is a matter of individual taste and habit of mind to determine, if we, as Americans, are required to be more sensitive guardians of the honor of France and Great Britain than were their own representatives at Vienna,—than now are the great statesmen of England, who, as ministers of the crown, decided for the war,—than is the fallen minister of Napoleon III., who during the long and tedious controversy has shown himself to be the only match in Western Europe for the clear-headed and thorough-bred diplomatists of Russia and Germany.

ART. X.—1. *Extracts from the Diary and Correspondence of the late AMOS LAWRENCE; with a brief Account of some Incidents in his Life.* Edited by his Son, WILLIAM R. LAWRENCE, M. D. [Not published.] Boston. 1855. 8vo. pp. 307.

2. The same. [Revised.] Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1855. 12mo. pp. 359.

“It costs him no sacrifice or self-denial to be generous,” is our first thought in abatement of the praise bestowed on a rich man who is free and bountiful in his charities. But observation has shown us, and persons who have made trial of both narrow and large fortunes have assured us, that the willingness to give is wont to decrease with growing wealth, so that those who have little more than a competence are ordinarily the most beneficent. We are in no danger of ascertaining by experiment, and can therefore only claim our birthright privilege of conjecture, what it is that clenches